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Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between female labour market participation
and mortgage commitments in a life-cycle set up. In particular, it examines whether
a mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint has any eﬀect on female labour market partici-
pation. This is done by conditioning on the mortgage decision in a labour market
participation equation for married women. Endogeneity of the mortgage variable is
tested using house price data. Panel data from the British Household Panel Study is
used in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in participation.
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1Summary
• This paper analyses the relationship between female labour participation and mort-
gage commitments in a life-cycle set up for UK households.
• It is important to study the relationship between labour supply and mortgage-
related liquidity constraints because housing represents the biggest component of
household assets in the UK and because of the existence of an explicit constraint
related to labour income when the mortgage is taken out.
• The data used are from the British Household Panel Survey for the years 1993-
2000, and the working sample is made of women aged 25-40, in couples, whose
husband works full-time. Self-employed individuals and renters are excluded from
the analysis.
• Estimation is performed by means of a ﬁxed eﬀect logit model, which means that
individual unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for without imposing any
structure on the correlation between this and the explanatory variables. In this
speciﬁc context, it is important to allow individual preference towards work to be
correlated with mortgage decisions.
• It is found that mortgage commitments, as captured by the ratio between monthly
mortgage payment and household income excluding female’s earned income, have
a positive eﬀect on female participation, at least up to age 34. However, the neg-
ative eﬀect on female participation of having a young child is very strong and the
combined eﬀect of children and mortgage commitments on participation can stay
negative.
• Endogeneity of the mortgage variable is a potential issue; it could emerge due,
for example, to correlation between mortgage decisions and transitory shocks or
to reverse causality from participation to the mortgage. A test of endogeneity is
performed in a control function framework using house prices as control variables.
We use, respectively: house prices at Local Authority District level, by house type,
for the years 1995-2000; and the interaction between house prices at regional level
at the time the mortgage was taken out and current mortgage interest rates. The
null hypothesis of no endogeneity cannot be rejected.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyses the relationship between female labour market participation and
mortgage commitments in a life-cycle setting.
Most of the literature concerning life-cycle models and borrowing constraints has fo-
cused on the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption, assuming labour supply to
be exogenous. However, it is worth investigating whether this is a plausible assumption.
In fact, labour supply may be thought of as a way to circumvent or to reduce the impact
of borrowing constraints, and so assuming that it is exogenous would produce biased
estimates of the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption.
The importance of mortgages in the context of borrowing constraints and labour supply
decisions derives from two sources. The ﬁrst is that housing is usually the most substantial
component of assets for home owners. The second is that there is an explicit mortgage
qualiﬁcation constraint, based on household annual income and assets, when the mortgage
is taken out.
The ways in which mortgage commitments can be interpreted , will now be analysed
in turn.
When taking out a mortgage individuals normally face two types of constraints: a
wealth constraint, typically in the form of a minimum downpayment, and an income
constraint, typically in the form of a maximum ratio of mortgage payment to household
earned income. In the UK, it is theoretically possible to borrow up to 100% of the
property’s value (although a higher lending fee, the so-called MIG -Mortgage Indemnity
Guarantee-, normally applies for mortgages of more than around 90% of the property
value) and the eﬀective qualiﬁcation constraint is the one related to the household income.
The Financial Service Authority reports that "typically, the maximum mortgage a lender
oﬀers is three times the main earner’s income plus one times any second earner’s income,
or two-and-a-half times the [households] joint income". Hence, there exists an explicit
mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint that is a function of household earned income.
Although it formally applies when the mortgage is taken out, it is possible to consider
an income constraint as holding at every period during which the mortgage is being
repaid as long as remortgaging is a possibility. Fortin (1995) justiﬁes the presence of such a
constraint at every period on the basis of the Canadian institutional setting, where people
remortgage very frequently1 or, alternatively, in the light of allocational inﬂexibilities
1In the selected sample used in this work, 20.5% of households take out additional mortgage on their
home at least once during the observation period.
3introduced by mortgage payments in the household decision process. In other words, it is
explicitly taken into account that mortgage payments might alter household consumption
and leisure decisions due to the fact that they must be met at every period and that they
normally constitute a substantial part of households’ total income.
Moreover, a more general earnings-related borrowing constraint (see Alessie, Melenberg
and Weber (1988) and Aldershof et al. (1997)) may apply to households that have taken
out a mortgage. If capital markets are imperfect, people might not be able to borrow as
much as they would like to, and one way to express the borrowing constraint is in terms of
earned income. In particular, individuals who earn more can borrow up to a higher sum
than people who earn less, on the basis that their higher earnings reﬂect higher human
capital to be used as collateral. Households with mortgages might be particularly subject
to this type of constraint if their home equity is still low and they do not have other
assets to oﬀer as collateral. However, it might be the case that individuals with higher
earnings, together with a mortgage, hold assets of various forms, hence rendering this
type of borrowing constraint binding only for households at the bottom of the income
distribution.
An important issue that follows from the existence of a mortgage-related qualiﬁcation
constraint is that mortgage commitments are potentially endogenous in labour supply
decisions. Most of the literature that addresses the relationship between mortgage com-
mitments and labour supply decisions takes mortgage choice (whether to take out a
mortgage, its size) as exogenous (see Fortin (1995), Aldershof et al (1997)). In other
words, the borrowing constraint is considered to hold at every period but the amount of
the mortgage payment is assumed to be exogenous. This will be the implicit assumption
in the ﬁrst part of this analysis as well. That is, it will be assumed that the direction of
causality in the relationship between mortgage commitments and labour market partici-
pation runs from the former to the latter. The hypothesis of exogeneity is then tested in
the second part of the paper.
Most of the studies that have been carried out so far have analysed a single cross-
section of the data set of interest and have thus relied on a static-level analysis. In this
work, panel data from the British Household Panel Study will be used. Although a static
model will be estimated, unlike static models based on a single cross-section, individual
unobserved heterogeneity will be controlled for.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the related literature.
Section 3 contains the theoretical frameworkt h a ti su s e da sag u i d ei nt h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of the empirical results. Section 4 describes the data set as well as sample selection
4issues and the variables used in the analysis. It also contains a descriptive section on the
relationship between participation and mortgage commitments. Section 5 presents the
empirical model and the estimation methods, a description of the empirical results and a
discussion of endogeneity of mortgage choice. Section 6 concludes.
2 The literature review
The eﬀect of mortgage market constraints has been analysed in relation to diﬀerent types
of household decisions such as tenure, savings and labour supply. Either the institutional
borrowing constraints regarding the downpayment or the ratio of mortgage payments to
household income, or both, have been considered. Some works have instead adopted a
more general borrowing constraint.
Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) examine housing demand and female labour supply in
the context of a three-period life-cycle model in which households choose the type of tenure
(renting/owning), consumption of other goods and female labour supply, subject to a life-
time budget constraint and to an additional constraint related to the downpayment for
those who choose to own. They estimate the savings function and the female labour supply
function for the two tenure types from a cross-section of the Japanese National Survey
of Family Income and Expenditure, by using a two-step Heckman procedure. Tenure
choice and savings are made to depend, among other variables, on permanent income
of the household head, total net assets and price of land. It is found that changes in
husbands’ permanent income and/or the price of land aﬀect the tenure decision and that
this switching eﬀect makes the price of housing aﬀect the savings rate in two opposite
directions. Whether the switching eﬀect aﬀects female labour supply as well, is not
examined.
Fortin (1995) analyses the relationship between household labour supply and the mort-
gage qualiﬁcation constraint expressed in terms of a maximum gross debt service ratio
(mortgage payments/gross household income). The theoretical setting is that of a mul-
tiperiod life-cycle model with utility maximization over leisure and consumption, subject
to the current period allocation of life-time wealth and to the additional mortgage qual-
iﬁcation constraint based on earnings. It is assumed that this mortgage qualiﬁcation
constraint holds at every period on the basis of the Canadian institutional setting, where
people remortgage very frequently. Using 1986 data from the Canadian Family Expen-
diture Survey, the ﬁrst estimate is of a reduced form model of female labour supply in
relation to a set of housing variables that include the value of the house owned, the
5balance of mortgage and dummy variables for diﬀerent levels of the ratio of mortgage
charges to gross family income (exclusive of wife’s labour income). Both a higher balance
of mortgage and a higher ratio of mortgage charges to other family income positively
aﬀect female labour market participation and hours of work. Subsequently, two labour
earnings equations are estimated in relation to the theoretical model. In order to test
whether binding constraints for mortgage qualiﬁcation inﬂuence wives’ participation, one
equation relates to the case in which the housing constraint applies to both the husband
and the wife, and the other equation relates to the case in which it applies only to hus-
band’s earnings. It emerges that the housing constraint should apply to both spouses but
the husband’s earnings should be given a greater weight than the wife’s.
Aldershof et al. (1997) analyse the relationship between female labour supply and
housing consumption by developing a life-cycle consistent model in which households
maximise expected lifetime utility over female leisure, housing consumption and non-
housing consumption, subject to a housing production function, to the standard lifetime
budget constraint and to an earnings-related liquidity constraint.2 Hence, labour supply
and housing consumption are jointly determined. Separability of preferences between
these two choices is tested by estimating the female labour supply function conditional
on housing consumption and it is not rejected. Estimation is based on the 1989 wave
of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. Moreover, it is found that female labour supply
is positively aﬀected by the ratio of mortgage interest payments to total family income
(exclusive of the woman’s earnings), which is considered to be a proxy for the presence
of binding liquidity constraints.
Del Boca and Lusardi (2001) examine whether imperfections in the credit market,
and in particular in the mortgage market, spill over to the labour market by using the
1989 and 1993 cross-sections from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
Exogenous changes in the mortgage market, such as the reduction of the down payment
and wider access to the mortgage market (due both to the ﬁnancial liberalization brought
by the European uniﬁcation in 1992 and to the Amato Act of 1990), are considered to be
an important source of variation to identify these eﬀects. The decision to participate in
the labour market and to obtain a mortgage are modelled in terms of a latent variables
simultaneous equation model. Mortgage debt is introduced in the empirical estimation
using a dummy and a continuous variable for the amount outstanding. It is found that
2It is through this earnings dependent liquidity constraint that mortgage commitments are expected
to relate to female labour supply. It is argued that the constraint is more likely to be binding in cases
where the household has high mortgage commitments.
6it has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on female labour participation. A dummy and the
outstanding value owed are also used for family debt and for other types of debt (car,
appliances) to check whether mortgage commitment is diﬀerent from other types of debt.
The direction of causality between borrowing constraints and labour supply is assessed
by relying on variables proxing for the credit system3 and the changes in the mortgage
market over time.
3 The theoretical framework
The theoretical framework that is adopted as a guide for the empirical speciﬁcation is
one of dynamic programming where individuals choose labour supply (participation) and
consumption according to the value function
Vt(At)=m a x
Pt,ct
[ut(Pt,c t,Z t)+βEtVt+1(At+1)] (1)
subject to the standard asset accumulation rule and to a mortgage-related liquidity con-
straint,4 as follows:
At+1 =( 1+rt+1)[At +( yt + wftPt − ct − mo)] (2)
k(yt + wftPt) ≥ mo
where
At = assets at the beginning of period t
ut(·)=intra-temporal utility function at period t
Pt = hours of work (participation)
ct = consumption
Zt = demographic variables
Et = expectation operator based on information at time t
3They include whether people have a checking account, how many banks they have been using and
how many credit cards they use
4The mortgage- related borrowing constraint has been introduced following Fortin (1995). Also if
thought of in terms of allocational inﬂexibility, it is meant to be relevant for homeowners with mortgage
but not for renters. In fact, it could be argued that homeowners with mortgage who are incapable of
keeping up with mortgage payments could always move to a smaller house in the same way as renters
could move to a cheaper accommodation. However, as opposed to renters, in order to do that, they would
be subject to a mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint based on earnings. Alternatively, by staying in the same
accommodation, they would be subject to allocational inﬂexibilities (captured by the mortgage-related
borrowing constraint) in a way that renters would not be.
7β = consumer’s discount factor
rt = rate of return between period t − 1 and period t
yt = unearned (non-asset) income (husband’s income)
wft = female wage (earned income if Pt represents participation)
mo = mortgage payment at period t (assumed to be constant, i.e. non depending on
the interest rate)
k = proportion of total household income to be allocated to mortgage payments
Utility is assumed to be intertemporally separable and the intra-temporal utility func-
tion, ut(·), is assumed to be strictly concave and monotonically increasing in c and decreas-
ing in P (there is no presumption regarding Z). Moreover, the amount of the mortgage is
assumed to be exogenous so that the mortgage payment at period t is assumed as given.
First-order conditions are obtained from standard dynamic programming techniques
a n da r er e p r e s e n t e db yt h ef o l l o w i n g :
uct = βEt[(1 + rt+1)λt+1] (3)
uPt = βEt[(1 + rt+1)λt+1]wft− µtkwft (4)
λt = βEt[(1 + rt+1)λt+1] (5)
µt[k(yt + wftPt) ≥ mo]=0 ,µ t ≥ 0 (6)
where uct and uPt denote the ﬁrst-order derivatives of the utility function with respect
to consumption and hours of work, µt represents the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated
to the mortgage-related constraint and λt is the marginal utility of wealth (∂Vt/∂At).
When constraint (6) is binding, µt > 0 and Pt =
mo/k−yt
wft . Hence,
µt = f(mo,y t,w ft) (7)
The eﬀect of the mortgage constraint, when binding, is that participation becomes a
function of mortgage payment, other family income and female wage. By contrast, when
it is not binding, µt =0and participation does not depend on mortgage payment.
Using ﬁrst-order conditions (3)-(5), optimal consumption and labour supply equations
are deﬁned as follows:
ct = ct(λt,w ft,Z t,µ t) (8)
Pt = Pt(λt,w ft,Z t,µ t) (9)
8The equations derived for consumption and participation are the so-called Frisch equa-
tions.5 In this framework, λ is interpreted as capturing all the information from other
periods that is required in order to obtain the optimal choice in the current period (e.g.
it could be thought of as reﬂecting household permanent income).6
In the theoretical framework presented so far, optimization is carried out over hours
of work. However, the empirical speciﬁcation that will be introduced later is expressed in
terms of a participation rather than hours equation as a function of other family income,
demographics, ratio of mortgage payment to other family income (also interacted with
demographic variables). This discrepancy is purely due to the easier analytical tractability
of a continuous variable rather than a discrete one, and the model is meant to be just
an indication of the way in which the mortgage-related constraint aﬀects labour supply
decisions. Finding a positive eﬀect of the mortgage variable on participation is taken
as evidence that the mortgage borrowing constraint is binding, and hence that having a
mortgage distorts households participation decisions.
4T h e d a t a
The data used for this work is the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), waves 3-
10 (1993-2000).7 It reports information on British households on the basis of yearly
interviews conducted on an original sample of approximately 5,000 households (circa
10,000 individuals).8 The panel nature of the data set means that the same individuals
are interviewed each year.9
The data contains both household and individual level information. At the individual
level, apart from demographic characteristics such as age, region, number of children and
education, there is detailed information concerning current labour force status, labour
force history, health and personal ﬁnances (including diﬀerent sources of income and of
investment). Moreover, detailed wealth data is collected every ﬁve years.
At the household level, there is detailed information regarding household composition,
household expenditure and tenure type of the home lived in, and details on rent or mort-
gage payments and on loan repayments. In particular, housing information is provided
5Demand functions derived by holding the marginal utility of wealth constant.
6In an empirical speciﬁcation, λ would then be modelled as an individual ﬁxed eﬀect.
7Waves 1 and 2 are not being used since wave 2 reports many missing observations on housing variables.
8Children are interviewed if above 16.
9In fact, the selected sample that is being analysed in this work reports on average 4.3 observations per
individual over 8 years. This is partly due to attritrion and partly to sample selection (see next section).
9with diﬀerent degrees of detail according to whether households own the accommodation,
are paying a mortgage or are renting. Each year, all respondents are asked about the
type of accommodation and the number of rooms. Homeowners, including those with a
mortgage, also provide their estimate of the value of the house (based on current prices).
Further, owners with mortgage are asked to provide some information every year and
some additional information the ﬁrst time they are interviewed at their current address.
Among the information which is provided only by people being interviewed for the ﬁrst
time (or who have moved address since previous interview), there is the following: the
year in which the mortgage was taken out, the original cost of the house, the original
amount of the mortgage (excluding later additions), the number of years the mortgage
has still to run and the type of mortgage (whether a repayment mortgage, an endowment
mortgage, a mixture of the two or some other type). Every year homeowners with a
mortgage are asked whether any additional mortgage has been taken out, its amount, the
destination use of it (home extension/ improvement, car purchase, other consumer goods,
other). They are also asked to provide the last total monthly instalment on the mortgage
or loan.10 Finally, there are three direct questions on liquidity constraints related to ei-
ther rent or mortgage payments. In particular, respondents are asked whether there have
been any diﬃculties paying for the accommodation in the last twelve months, and, in case
of aﬃrmative answer, whether this has resulted in borrowing money or in cutting back
on other household spending. Respondents are also asked whether or not the household
has been more than two months behind with the rent or mortgage payment.
4.1 Sample selection
Since the purpose of this work is to analyse whether mortgage-related borrowing con-
straints aﬀect households’ labour participation, the focus will be on female participation
on the ground that males normally work full time and so their labour supply behaviour is
already constrained. Only people who are in couples (either married or cohabiting) and
of diﬀerent sex will be taken into account and, in line with Fortin (1995), it will be people
who are in couples in which the husband works full time and so receives a regular salary.
The number of observations drops from 90998 to 45082.
Self-employed are selected out on the basis of the assumption that their labour supply
behaviour is diﬀerent from employed people.11 Moreover, renters are removed from the
10It includes life insurance payments if they are paid together with the mortgage, and it includes both
the premium and the interests if it is an endowment mortgage.
11In particular, self-employed people do not receive a ﬁxed wage as is assumed in this analysis.
10sample as it is assumed that the tenure decision is exogenous and the focus is on home-
owners either with or without a mortgage. Finally, only women in the age range 25-45 are
kept for the analysis. This is based on the assumption that above this range the mort-
gage qualiﬁcation constraint is unlikely to be binding, moreover it is in this range that
interactions with the presence of children are more likely to take place. The ﬁnal working
sample is of 12510 observations, that is, 6255 households. Since we have an unbalanced
panel, the number of households is in fact 1475, of which 281 are only observed once over
8 periods and 258 are observed over the whole period (8 times). A varying number of 120
and 200 households are observed 2-7 times. On average, people are observed 4.3 times out
of 8 periods. The sample selection plays an important role in this apparent high attrition,
both through selection of people in couples and through the choice of the age range.
4.2 Description of variables
Female participation
It is a dummy variable deﬁned on the basis of whether the female did any paid work
the week before the interview and, in case of negative answer, whether she had a job
that she was away from in the same week.12 Since this deﬁnition may assign women who
did casual work and who were on maternity leave to the group of participants in the
labour market,13 two alternative deﬁnitions of participation have been used to check the
sensitivity of the results. One is based on whether the number of weeks of employment
during the year before the interview was positive and the other is based on whether the
declared current employment status is that of being in paid employment. None of these
alternative deﬁnitions change the pattern of the results.
Demographic information
The BHPS includes all the standard demographic information such as age, education,
number of children, age range of children and region of residence.
In the analysis that follows female’s age has been rescaled, so that the youngest fe-
males in the selected sample (25 years old) are the reference group. Its square has also
been included in order to take into account non-linearities in the relationship between
participation and age.
Children possibly play a central role as the focus of the analysis is on female par-
12"Any paid work" includes any number of hours, including Saturday jobs and casual work. The reasons
of being away from work include those on maternity leave, on holiday, on strike and on sick leave.
13It turns out that only 8 observations register the female as participating while she is in fact on
maternity leave.
11ticipation at early/middle stage of the life cycle. The number of children is controlled
for, as is age of the youngest child using dummies which indicate whether the youngest
child is either between 0 and 2 years of age or between 3 and 4 years of age. As long
as this adds information to the analysis, a dummy for the youngest child being above 5
years of age will be included. Female’s education and the region of residence are used as
additional control variables whenever the estimation method does not eliminate the ﬁxed
eﬀect. Education is summarised by four dummy variables: no education, O level, A level,
degree or higher. Dummies are deﬁned for each of nineteen regions.
Income measures
Since the focus of this analysis is on female labour participation, it is necessary to
control for income eﬀects related to unearned income. Hence, the log of other family
income deﬁned as all household income but female’s earned income (i.e. husband’s earned
and non-earned income and the female non-earned income) is included as explanatory
variable. In particular, monthly non-labour income is recovered from the sum of all non-
labour income in the year prior the start of the interview period, whereas labour income
is given by the usual gross pay per month.14
Mortgage and housing information
Of all the housing information described in the previous section, the main variable
that has been used in this context is the monthly mortgage payment. The ratio between
the monthly mortgage payment and the other family income is the so-called obligation
ratio (or). As opposed to the ratio that enters the mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint, this
ratio has other family income rather than total family income in the denominator, the
diﬀerence between the two being the female earned income.
The obligation ratio is expected to capture the eﬀect on household labour market par-
ticipation of the variation in the burden of mortgage commitments relative to household
income. In other words, it is expected to capture the eﬀect of mortgage-related borrowing
constraints on labour market participation. Although the institutional mortgage quali-
ﬁcation constraint should hold only when the mortgage is taken out, it is plausible to
think that it may hold also in subsequent periods. In fact, a positive correlation between
the obligation ratio and female participation may be taken as evidence of this hypothe-
sis. Fortin (1995) suggests that the mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint may hold after the
mortgage has been taken out as people may remortgage quite frequently. On the other
hand, variation in interest rates may provide another reason for variation in participation
14It is gross payment in the month before interview as long as this is the usual payment; when only the
net monthly income was available, BHPS imputed values have been used.
12related to mortgage commitments. For instance, assuming that the constraint binds, a
household that obtained a mortgage on the basis of only male’s income and then faces an
increase in the obligation ratio due either to higher interest rates or to a decline in male’s
earnings, would probably have to increase its labour market participation in order to
lessen the eﬀect of the underlying mortgage-related borrowing constraint. Alternatively,
it could re-mortgage but in that case it would face the institutional mortgage qualiﬁcation
constraint. Hence, either implicitly or explicitly, the earnings-related mortgage constraint
would hold not only when the mortgage is taken out but also in subsequent periods.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.a and Figure 1.a illustrate female labour market participation behaviour by dif-
ferent types of tenure and age as obtained from the pooled selected sample (years 1993-
2000).15 Both document a strikingly higher participation rate for females in households
that have a mortgage, particularly in the age range 30-35, when presumably labour supply
decisions are strongly related to the presence and the age of children. Whereas participa-
tion for women without a mortgage shows a deﬁnite U-shaped pattern with its minimum
at the age of 32-33, participation for those with a mortgage only decreases slightly from
84% to 80%. The participation rates of renters appear to be in between the participation
rate of owners with no mortgage and owners with a mortgage for any age after 29 and it
is the lowest before age 29.
Since households that own the house outright are less than 4% of the sample that
includes renters,16 and since 80% of households in the same sample own with a mortgage,
it is necessary to rule out the possibility that the above result is driven by the small
number of observations for the group of outright owners, particularly for age below 35.
Rather than dividing the group of owners into those who own outright and those who
have a mortgage, the two groups are deﬁned according to whether the monthly mortgage
payment is below or above the 33rd percentile of the distribution of the monthly mortgage
payment (dummy for low/high mortgage payment), where the group with low mortgage
payment includes those that own outright. As documented in Table 1.b and in Figure
1.b, up to the age of 36 the participation rate of these two groups presents the same
features as the groups of owners outright and owners with mortgage, with a deﬁnite U-
shaped pattern for those with low monthly mortgage payment (although, as expected,
15The ﬁgures have been obtained by running mean least-squares smoothing and conﬁdence intervals
have been constructed from pointwise standard errors of smoothed values of participation.
164.5% of the sample with no renters.
13the average participation rate for the group of owners with low mortgage is now higher
than before). After the age of 36 the two patterns are very similar, possibly due to the
fact that the mortgage-related constraint is no longer binding. The participation rate of
renters, on the other hand, is now lower than the one of both groups of home owners.
In what follows it is then further explored the relationship between the participation
rate of home owners (with and without a mortgage) by focusing on a sample that excludes
renters. The obligation ratio is used instead of the mortgage monthly payment in order
to net out the eﬀect of household income (excluding female labour income) from a mea-
sure of allocational inﬂexibilities imposed by the mortgage.17 Figure 2 follows the same
logic as Figure 1 but is based on the obligation ratio rather than the level of mortgage
monthly payment. It illustrates the pattern of female participation according to whether
the obligation ratio is below or above its 33rd percentile level. As for the mortgage level,
the pattern of female participation for the group with low obligation ratio is U-shaped,
with a minimum at the age of 32-33, whereas participation for the group with high oblig-
ation ratio stays at a signiﬁcant higher level and has only a slight decline at the age of
35. This indicates that other household income is positively related to monthly mort-
gage payment (otherwise the relative and the absolute mortgage payments would have
diﬀerent eﬀects on labour participation) and that there is a positive correlation between
mortgage-related allocational inﬂexibilities (as represented by the obligation ratio) and
female labour market participation.
This latter feature is explored further in Figure 3 by controlling for the presence of
young children in the household. In fact, it might be argued that mortgage decisions and
fertility decisions are not separable. It turns out that even when the youngest child is
between 0 and 2 year old a high obligation ratio signiﬁcantly increases the probability
t h a tf e m a l e sw o r km o r et h a ni nc a s e sw h e r et h eobligation ratio is low, at least after the
age of 32. When the youngest child in the household is between 3 and 4 year old, the
same result holds in the age range 32-37.
Tables 2 and 3 report female labour market participation by 5-year-age groups and
obligation ratio quartiles (the lower quartile is deﬁned for or ≤ 0.104 and the upper
17In fact, the institutional mortgage borrowing constraint imposes an upper bound on the mortgage
level in terms of household income. Hence, if household income does not change signiﬁcantly over time,
and mortgage payments do not decrease (for instance due to decreasing interest rates) it is plausible
to expect that mortgage payments are positively related to household income. Hence, the eﬀect of the
burden imposed by the mortgage on female labour supply must be measured in relative terms (relative
to household income, excluding female labour income) rather than in absolute ones.
14one for or ≥ 0.219). In table 2 children are not controlled for. It emerges that female
labour market participation is higher the higher the obligation ratio for any age group.
Particularly in the age range 25-35, labour market participation for the group with the
highest obligation ratio is about 20 percentage points higher than for the group with
the lowest participation ratio: female participation is 72% for those aged 25-30 with an
obligation ratio below 10.4%, it is 93% if their obligation ratio is above 21.9%, and it is
78.7% and 83.8% if their obligation ratio is in between 10.4% and 21.9%. For females
aged 30-35, participation goes from 66% to 86% when switching from the lowest to the
highest obligation ratio.
When controlling for the presence of the youngest child in the age range 0-2 (Table 3),
it is still true that females with the highest obligation ratio have a higher participation
rate than those with the lowest obligation ratio. However, for the age group 25-30, the
participation pattern is no longer increasing for intermediate levels of the obligation ratio.
Whereas those having an obligation ratio below 10.4% have a participation rate of 65%,
those having an obligation ratio between 10.4% and 21.9% have a participation rate of,
respectively, 59% and 61%. Also when controlling for the presence of the youngest child in
the age range 3-4 some non-linearities are present for the age group 25-30. It is noteworthy
that participation is around 50% for all the females between 25 and 40 year of age with
an obligation ratio below 10.4% whereas it is well above 80% for those with an obligation
ratio above 21.9%.
Of course these results are obtained ignoring the panel structure of the data set and
hence they can only be taken as a rough indication of a positive relationship between
mortgage-related allocational inﬂexibilities and female labour market participation. The
analysis of this relationship in a regression framework that accounts for unobserved het-
erogeneity in labour market participation will be carried out in the next sections using
the panel structure.
155 The empirical model
A static female participation equation with unobserved heterogeneity is estimated. Specif-
ically, the form of the estimated equation is:18
Pit =1{β lnyit + γZit + δHit + θ1ageit ∗ orit + θ2yoch02it ∗ orit + αi + εit ≥ 0} (10)
where P is a binary variable indicating whether the female participates in the labour
market.
lny is the log of other family income and Z is a vector of variables that capture
demographic characteristics. Typically it includes (a polynomial in) age and the number
of children as well as the age of youngest child. H is a vector of mortgage and housing
variables. In the analysis that follows, it includes the obligation ratio (or), that is, the
ratio of mortgage monthly payment to other family income and, possibly, the value of
the house (in logs, to capture an income eﬀect), the remaining mortgage life, the total
mortgage outstanding.
T h ev a r i a b l eo fi n t e r e s ti sor and its interactions with age and with the number of
children. Interactions with age are meant to capture a diﬀerent eﬀect of the mortgage-
related borrowing constraint at diﬀerent stages of the life-cycle. In fact, for people who
take out a mortgage when they are 25, this interaction captures the eﬀect related to the
remaining life of the mortgage. The interaction with a dummy for the presence of young
children in the household is meant to control for the possibility that the eﬀect of mortgage
c o m m i t m e n t si sd i ﬀerent for people with and without young children.
αi is the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and εit is the time-varying error term.
5.1 Estimation method
The equation that is estimated in this work belongs to the class of non-linear panel data
models with individual speciﬁce ﬀect, and in particular to the class of discrete choice
panel data models, as represented by the following:
yit =1{xitβ + αi + εit ≥ 0} t =1 ,2,...,T i=1 ,2,...,n
18It is worth noticing that as long as mortgage monthly payment is small relative to household’s other
income, a speciﬁcation including the the log of other household income and the level of obligation ratio
(and no interactions) as explanatory variables represents an approximation (a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion)
of a speciﬁcation containing only the log of net income (other family income net of mortgage payment).
In that case, the eﬀect of the mortgage variable would be interpreted in terms of income eﬀect.
16As a special case, if it is further assumed that εit’s are independent and logistically
distributed conditional on αi,x i1,x i2,...,x iT, it follows that
Pr(yit =1 |xi1,x i2,...,x iT,α i)=
exp(xitβ + αi)
1+e x p ( xitβ + αi)
as in the standard logit model,19 with the only diﬀerence being the individual speciﬁc
eﬀect, αi.
Estimating β requires dealing with the individual speciﬁce ﬀect, αi. There are basi-
cally two methods for doing this, and they will be surveyed in this section. Essentially,
one approach, which deﬁnes the so-called ﬁxed eﬀects model, imposes no assumptions
on the relationship between αi and the explanatory variables and uses instead a method
that "eliminates" the individual speciﬁce ﬀect on the basis of the same idea that informs
diﬀerencing in the linear panel data model with ﬁxed eﬀects. A second approach, which
deﬁnes the so-called random eﬀects model, assumes that both the individual speciﬁce ﬀect
and the idiosyncratic shock are independent of observable characteristics (xi1,x i2,...,x iT).
The distribution of αi conditional on xi1,x i2,...,x iT is speciﬁed parametrically (semipara-
metrically) so that the individual speciﬁce ﬀect is then integrated out.
In the ﬁxed eﬀects model the idea is to "eliminate" the individual speciﬁce ﬀect by
allowing it to be correlated in any form with the explanatory variables. A consistent
estimator for β can be obtained by conditional maximum likelihood, where conditioning
occurs with respect to the data (xi1,x i2,...,x iT) and to a suﬃcient statistic for the ﬁxed
eﬀect.20 If the suﬃcient statistic depends on β, the parameter to be estimated, then the
conditional distribution of the data given the suﬃcient statistic depends on β, and not
on αi,a n ds oβ can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The problem with this method
is that there is no common suﬃcient statistic for the non-linear panel data models such
that the conditional distribution of the data given the suﬃcient statistic depends on β.
It follows that the method for constructing a likelihood function that does not depend
upon the ﬁxed eﬀect is strictly related to the speciﬁc non-linear functional form that is
chosen as a representation of the data.
19Similarly, if εit’s are independent and normally distributed conditional on αi,x i1,x i2,...,xiT,t h e n
Pr(yit =1 |xi1,x i2,...,xiT,α i)=Φ(xitβ + αi)
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution.
20A suﬃcient statistic for αi is a function of the data such that the distribution of the data given the
suﬃcient statistic does not depend on αi.
17One case in which the conditional maximum likelihood method can be successfully
applied is the one outlined above, where εit’s are independent and logistically distributed
conditional on αi,x i1,x i2,...,x iT (Conditional ML Logit). Here, the suﬃcient statistic
that "eliminates" the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and lets the conditional distribution depend
on β is given by ΣT
t=1yit, i.e. the number of times that yit =1for the individual.
Hence, in this application a suﬃcient statistic is given by the number of times that each
female participates in the labour market over the observation period (1993-2000).21 The
drawback of "eliminating" the unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect in this fashion is that also observed
ﬁxed eﬀects do not enter the conditional likelihood function and hence cannot be used
as controls. In fact, identiﬁcation requires that right hand side variables vary over time
within individuals. Moreover, the explanatory variables must be strictly exogenous, that
is, current shocks, εit, must be uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the
the explanatory variable x: E(εit|xi1,x i2,...,x iT)=0 ,t =1 ,2,...,T. 22
This is a very strong identiﬁcation assumption. In this work, a violation of strict
exogeneity may occur if εit is correlated with orit, the obligation ratio (i.e. if current
mortgage payment is driven by a shock in the female’s participation, such as an unex-
pected lay-oﬀ that makes the household obtain a low mortgage, or if current mortgage
payment is correlated with past participation and the "true" model is one with lagged
particpation but the estimated model ignores the lags). Moreover, assuming also children
as strictly exogenous means that labour supply decisions do not aﬀect fertility decisions.
As a further point, in these types of models the parameter(s) of interest are identiﬁed
21Since cases in which the female does not switch between participation and non-participation (i.e. cases
in which she participates at every period and cases in which she never participates) do not contribute to the
likelihood function, β is in fact estimated on the basis of females that switch status at least once between
period 1 and period T. This means that the only relevant information for the conditional distribution is
given by the cases in which Σ
T
t=1yit 6=0 ,T.
22As pointed out by Honoré (2002), this assumption is probably unrealistic in most economic context in
which t represents time and particularly in cases in which yit is the outcome of an individual’s optimization
problem so that it is expected that yit enters as an explanatory variable in the equation for yi,t+1.T h i s
is very likely to be the case for females labour force participation decisions.
In a model with lagged participation as explanatory variable, a weaker assumption than strict exogeneity
would be prederminedness. In other words, given a model like the following:
yit = γyit−1 + β0xit + β1xit−1 + αi + εit
x would be predermined if E(εit|xi1,x i2,...,xit,yi1,y i2,...,yit−1)=0 , i.e. if current shocks were uncor-
related with past values of y and with past and current values of x.
18only up to scale23 and conditional on the individual speciﬁce ﬀect. As pointed out by
Honoré (2002), by knowing the coeﬃcient of the explanatory variable in a ﬁxed eﬀects logit
model it is possible to judge the relative importance of diﬀerent time-varying explanatory
variables as well as to calculate the eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the probability
that the dependent variable takes the value 1 conditional on a particular value for the
individual speciﬁce ﬀect. However, it is not possible to calculate the average eﬀect of
the explanatory variable(s) on the same probability taken across the distribution of the
individual speciﬁce ﬀect in the population.
The random eﬀects model "eliminates" the individual speciﬁce ﬀect by assuming a
parametric distribution for αi conditional on xi1,x i2,...,x iT so that αi can be integrated
out of the conditional distribution of the data.
For the Probit model, the traditional assumption is that of independence between
αi and xi1,x i2,...,x iT, although Chamberlain (1984) in fact allows for some correlation
between them. Using Wooldridge (2002) deﬁnition, the "traditional random eﬀects probit
model" assumes that the distribution of the individual speciﬁce ﬀect, αi, conditional on
the observables is as follows: αi|xi1,x i2,...,x iT ∼ N(0,σ2
α), which implies that αi and the
vector (xi1,x i2,...,x iT) are independent and that αi is normally distributed.
As already mentioned, a particular case is that of Chamberlain (1984)’s random eﬀects
probit model, where the conditional distribution of the individual speciﬁce ﬀect is allowed
to depend linearly on the observables (assumption 2 below). More formally, Chamberlain’s
random eﬀects probit model is obtained under the following assumptions:
1. (εi1,ε i2,...,ε iT) is independent of αi and of (xi1,x i2,...,x iT), with a multivariate





















, where Φ(·) is the standard normal
distribution;
2. the distribution for the individual speciﬁce ﬀect conditional on (xi1,x i2,...,x iT) is
linear in the xs and normally distributed:
αi = λ0+λ1xi1+λ2xi2+...+λTxiT +νi where νi ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) and independent of the xs.
23Arellano (2000) recalls that in the logit case the scale normalization is imposed through the variance
of the logistic distribution (and, in general, by the form of the cumulative distribution of εit|xi1,...,x iT,α i,
if known).
19Given assumptions 1. and 2., the distribution for yit conditional on (xi1,x i2,...,x iT)
has a probit form:
Pr(yit =1 |xi1,x i2,...,x iT)=Φ
µ





A more parsimonious version of Chamberlain’s model allows the individual speciﬁc
eﬀect to depend on the average of xit, t =1 ,2,...,T,w h i c hw ec a l l¯ xi, rather than on each
single xit,a sf o l l o w s : 24
αi = λ0 + λ1¯ xi + νi ,w h e r eνi ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) and independent of the xs.
The distribution for yit conditional on (xi1,x i2,...,x iT) then takes the following form:
Pr(yit =1 |xi1,x i2,...,x iT)=Φ
µ





Alternatively, a random eﬀects logit model is deﬁned under the assumption that the
distribution of the time-varying disturbances conditional on the individual speciﬁce ﬀect,
εit|αi, are independently distributed according to a logistic cdf and that the individual
speciﬁce ﬀect, αi, conditional on (xi1,x i2,...,x iT) is normally distributed.
More generally, the joint distribution of the data conditional on observables is deﬁned
as follows:
Pr(yi1,yi2,...,y iT|xi1,x i2,...,x iT)=
Z
Pr(yi1,yi2,...,y iT|xi1,x i2,...,x iT,α i)dF(αi|xi1,x i2,...,x iT)
and F(αi|xi1,x i2,...,x iT),t h ecdf of the individual speciﬁce ﬀect conditional on ob-
servables, has some speciﬁed parametric (or semiparametric) form.
This makes the model fully parametric and so, if the explanatory variables are strictly
exogenous, maximum likelihood or methods of moments estimation can be applied.25
In this work both maximum likelihood random-eﬀects logit and maximum likelihood
random-eﬀects probit are estimated. The comparison between these two models, which
rely on a diﬀerent parametric speciﬁcation of the individual speciﬁce ﬀect, and of these two
models with the conditional maximum likelihood estimator, should give us an indication
of the nature of unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, estimation of a logit model is performed on the pooled sample by ignoring
the panel structure of the data. In other words, it is assumed that observations are i.i.d.
24See Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 15.
25Arellano and Honoré (2000) recall that there exists a practical issue in using maximum likelihood, in
terms of the speed and the accuracy in the calculation of a multinomial normal cumulative distribution.
20and follow a logit distribution and so the fact that observations may be correlated over
time within individuals due to the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity is not
taken into account. Hence, the individual speciﬁce ﬀect is assumed to be zero. Moreover,
the error term, εit, is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and with the explanatory
variables, xit.
yit = xitβ + εit , εit ∼ iid
Pr(yit =1 |xit)=Λ(xit)=
exp(xitβ)
1+e x p ( xitβ)
The comparison between the pooled logit and the conditional logit estimators should
give an indication of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity that can be taken into
account by using the panel structure of the data.
5.2 Empirical results
As emphasised in the previous section, one of the main identifying assumptions underly-
ing the estimates obtained here is that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous.
Hence, both feedback eﬀects from lagged participation to current and future values of
the obligation ratio and to current and future fertility decisions (predetermination) and
simultaneous decision about the mortgage and participation are assumed away.
The conditional ML logit, by allowing the individual speciﬁce ﬀect to depend upon the
explanatory variables, and by allowing this dependence to hold in an unspeciﬁed manner,
is the least restrictive estimation method adopted here. Since only observations where at
least one transition in participation has occurred over the observation period contribute
to the likelihood function in a conditional logit, from the sample of 6255 observations,
4598, corresponding to 1186 individuals, are dropped and 1657 are used in the estimation.
Estimation results from a conditional logit are reported in Table 5, column 1. The
variable of interest, the obligation ratio (or), has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
participation for the reference group of 25 year olds. The interaction of or with age
shows a negative sign, and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that the mortgage-
related constraint has a decreasing impact on participation over the life cycle. It takes
approximately 9 years (i.e. until the age of 34) to oﬀset the positive eﬀect of the obligation
ratio on the participation of a female with no children.
As expected, children have a strong impact on female participation. In particular,
having a youngest child aged either 0-2 or 3-4 has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
participation, as does the presence of any additional child in the household. Whether
21it is the negative eﬀect of children or the positive eﬀect of mortgage commitments that
dominates depends on the stage of the life cycle in which children enter. In fact, since
the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the dummy for having the youngest child in
age 3-4 is not signiﬁcant, the only relevant interaction between the obligation ratio and
children is the one involving the dummy for having a youngest child aged 0-2. So, for
instance, for a 25 year old female in a household with mortgage constraints and with the
youngest child between 0 and 2 years of age the net eﬀect on participation is positive,
whereas for a female in the same situation but with no mortgage constraints the eﬀect
on participation is negative. However, when the youngest child in the household is aged
0-2, the positive eﬀect of mortgage commitments on participation dominates the negative
one deriving from children only for women 28 or younger. In other words, a 30 year old
female with the youngest child aged 0-2 has a higher probability of participating if she
has no mortgage commitments.
Other family income, in logs, has the expected negative sign.
The conditional logit estimation results are compared with estimates from a random
eﬀects logit model in Table 5, column 2. As opposed to the conditional (ﬁxed eﬀects)
logit, all the observations are used (rather than just those in which there is a transition).
Identiﬁcation requires the cdf of the idiosyncratic shock conditional on the individual
speciﬁce ﬀe c tb el o g i s t i ca n dt h ei n d i v i d u a ls p e c i ﬁce ﬀe c tb en o r m a l l yd i s t r i b u t e da s
well as independent of the explanatory variables. Moreover, as for the conditional logit
model, strict exogeneity is assumed throughout. Both a speciﬁcation that includes con-
trols for education and region of residence and one that omits them are reported. In
both speciﬁcations, all coeﬃcients retain the same sign as in the conditional logit estima-
tion.26 However, the magnitude of both the obligation ratio and the age/obligation ratio
interaction changes substantially, being, respectively, 5.843 and -0.679 according to the
conditional logit and 8.023 and −0.335 according to the random eﬀects logit. This casts
doubts on the validity of the assumption underlying the random eﬀects model, that the
unobserved individual-speciﬁce ﬀect be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In
this case, it would mean assuming that preference towards work be uncorrelated with the
obligation ratio. This appears to be very unlikely since the mortgage is given according
to total family income, including female labour income (hence, participation).
26Most of the coeﬃcients on the time-varying explanatory variables do not change noticeably according
to whether these "ﬁxed" eﬀects are or are not included. The coeﬃcients that show the biggest change are
those for the log of other household income, the obligation ratio and the dummy for the youngest child
being 0-2.
22The random eﬀects probit model (see Table 6) produces substantially the same results
as the random eﬀects logit, both in terms of signiﬁcance and in terms of magnitude, once
the rescaling factor (of approximately 1.8) is taken into account. This result suggests
that the estimation results obtained under the random eﬀects model are not driven by
the functional form (probit or logit) assumed for the individual speciﬁce ﬀect. What
s e e m st op l a yt h em a j o rr o l ei st h ea s s u m p t i on of independence between the individual
speciﬁce ﬀect and the explanatory variables that underlies the random eﬀects model but
does not need to hold for the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.
One can test whether or not the data support the assumption of independence between
the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and the explanatory variables by estimating a “Chamberlain
random eﬀects probit”. This involves deﬁning the individual speciﬁce ﬀect as a linear
function of a vector of explanatory variables (or their average over time) and adding
these variables into the probit model. The null hypothesis is that the coeﬃcients on
the variables that deﬁne the individual speciﬁce ﬀect are jointly zero and this is tested
against the alternative that there is some correlation taking the form of a conditional
normal distribution with linear expectation and constant variance. In Table 6, column 3,
we report the results obtained by adopting, as conditioning variables for the individual
ﬁxed eﬀect, the individual average over time of both the obligation ratio and of the
interaction between age and the obligation ratio.27 T h et e s to nt h ej o i n ts i g n i ﬁcance of
these two coeﬃcients makes us reject the null hypothesis (χ2(2) = 39.60), so that the
usual random eﬀects probit is rejected in favour of a random eﬀects probit that allows
for some correlation between the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and the explanatory variables.
We take these results as further supporting the choice of a ﬁxed eﬀects logit since this
estimator remains consistent whether or not there is any correlation (of whatever form)
between the individual eﬀect and the explanatory variables of the model.
Finally, estimation of a logit model is performed on the pooled sample and is reported
in table 5, column 3. Comparison with the conditional logit estimates is expected to
inform on the gain arising from acknowledging the panel structure of the data, i.e. from
27This is to say that we run a standard random eﬀects probit on our usual set of explanatory variables
augmented with the individual mean of the obligation ratio over time and with the product of the individ-
ual means of age and of the obligation ratio over time. This corresponds to assuming that the conditional
distribution of the individual speciﬁce ﬀect has the following form:
αi|xi1,x i2,...,x iT ∼ N(λ0 + λ1ori + λ2ori ∗ agei,σ
2
ν)
23taking into account that observations may be correlated over time within individuals due
to the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. As for the random eﬀects models,
education and region of residence are controlled for. The coeﬃcients on all variables of
interest retain the sign that was found by conditional logit estimation method and most
of them are signiﬁcant. However, the interaction between age and the obligation ratio is
now insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the magnitude of the interaction term changes considerably
relative to the conditional logit (from −0.679 to −0.130, when education and region are
controlled for, and −0.117 when they are not). This perhaps suggests once again that
unobserved preference towards work is in fact relevant in modelling participation and that
it is correlated with age and with mortgage commitments.
5.3 Endogeneity
The variable of interest in this analysis, the obligation ratio, is likely to be endogenous for
a number of reasons. One way in which the error term of our model could be correlated
with the obligation ratio is through reverse causality between the mortgage and female
labour market participation. So far, we have assumed the mortgage choice is given and
consequently we have analysed the relationship as running from mortgage choice to labour
market participation. Due to the existence of the institutional mortgage qualiﬁcation
constraint (whether and how much one can borrow is a function of household labour
earnings, hence also of female labour participation prior to taking out the mortgage), it
is plausible to think of the causality as running from participation to the mortgage. As
long as participation is a ﬁxed individual eﬀect over the period analysed here, this should
not be a problem for our estimation. In fact, conditional logit estimation deals with the
individual speciﬁce ﬀect by allowing it to be correlated with the obligation ratio and
the other explanatory variables in any unspeciﬁed way. Our estimation would be biased
and inconsistent if, instead, today’s participation in the labour market were a function
of future mortgage payments in a way that is not "ﬁxed".28 This would be the case,
for instance, if participation today were driven by changes in the expectation of future
mortgage commitments.
Another potential source of endogeneity lies in simultaneous decisions about the mort-
gage and labour market participation. Even after controlling for the individual speciﬁc
eﬀe c t ,i tc o u l db et h ec a s et h a tt h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k( εit in equation (10)) is correlated
28Recall that conditional logit estimation requires that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous.
Focussing on the obligation ratio, this requirement translates into the following condition:
Pr(Pit =1 |ori1,...,or it,...,oriT;αi)=P r ( Pit =1 |orit;αi)
24with the obligation ratio if, for instance, a common shock hit the obligation ratio and
participation in the labour market simultaneously.
In order to test for endogeneity, we use house price data as an excluded variable in a
control function framework. House prices are presumably correlated with the obligation
ratio but uncorrelated with labour market participation, which makes them a suitable
instrument. We use two diﬀerent data sets for house prices, which we will brieﬂy outline
hereafter. A discussion of the method and results of the test will follow.
5.3.1 The data
We ﬁrst use data on house prices that contains quarterly information on residential prop-
erty transactions by house type (ﬂat, detached, semi-detached, terraced) at the Postal
Sector level between 1995 and 2000.29 In order to match it with the BHPS, we have
aggregated it at the Local Authority District level,30 which is the minimum geographical
area recorded for each individual. Then, we have taken annual average prices (ratio be-
tween annual volume of transactions and annual number of transactions), RPI adjusted,
by house type and Local Authority District (LAD). Therefore, the vector of the mortgage
variable, the obligation ratio for the years 1995-2000, is instrumented with a vector of
house prices for the corresponding years, appropriate for the Local Authority District and
the house type of the household. The BHPS sample includes years 1993 and 1994 but
house prices are collected only from 1995 onwards. 1500 observations (of the 6255) are
missing due to this. A futher 555 observations are dropped due to missing house prices
mostly in Scottish LADs.31
Since it might be argued that current house prices are not suitable instruments for a
mortgage that could have been taken out several years before, we also collect information
on house prices at the time the mortgage was taken out (RPI adjusted). Unfortunately,
we are not aware of any data set that collects house prices at Local Authority District level
29Residential property transaction data were built by Experian, and made available through MIMAS,
using information supplied by HM Land Registry.
30Conversion has been done at the MIMAS webpage (http://convert.mimas.ac.uk), within the Updated
Area Master Files project (based on the ONS All-Fields Postcode Directory (AFPD)). In some cases, the
Local Authority Districts as deﬁned in the BHPS did not match with the Census deﬁnition as of 1998,
particularly for Scotland and Wales. As a consequence, the match is not always 1:1. If more Census
districts form a BHPS district, the price index of the latter is the result of a weighted average of the prices
of the contributing districts, each of which with equal weights.
31See Appendix for a detailed list of LADs and corresponding number of missing observations.
25as far back in time as mortgages were taken out by households in our sample (the earliest
dates back to 1968 although 95 percent of households took out the mortgage in 1980 or
after). We then use house prices at regional level.32 Unlike the data at LAD level, house
prices are now the average dwelling price for all dwellings. We had to sacriﬁce geographic
and house type detail in order to ﬁnd earlier data. Since the mortgage is taken out at one
point in time, in order to capture the variability over time within individuals we interact
the house price measure with current (annual) mortgage interest rates.33 That is, the
vector of obligation ratio between 1993 and 2000 is instrumented with a vector of the
interactions between the average house price in the region of residence at the time the
mortgage was taken out and mortgage interest rates between 1993 and 2000.34
5.3.2 The test
The test of endogeneity for the mortgage variable (the obligation ratio) in our regression
is performed within a control function approach. We write our binary model as follows:
Pit =1 {xitβ0 + αi + εit ≥ 0} (11)
=1 {h(z1it,yit)+αi + εit ≥ 0}
where αi is the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and εit is the idiosyncratic shock; xit =( z1it,yit),
yit is the endogenous variable (the obligation ratio), and z1it is a vector of all the other
(exogenous) explanatory variables.35 yit is in turn determined by the exogenous variables
z1it and an "excluded instrument", z2it, given by house prices (or by the interaction
between house prices and interest rates), as follows:
yit = zitπ + δi + uit (12)
and
zit =( z1it,z2it), (13)
32The geographic units are "Standard Statistical Regions", namely: North, North-West, Yorkshire and
the Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, London, South-East, South-West, Wales,
and Scotland. The source of the data is the Survey of Mortgage Lenders made available through the
Oﬃce of the Deputy Prime Minister at www.odpm.gov.uk.
33This is justiﬁable on the basis that most mortgages in the UK have variable intrest rates.
34We should also note that using prices at LAD level carried the cost of loosing observations for the
years 1993-1994, when prices were not available. This is not the case when using prices at regional level
for the time the mortgage was taken out, although some observations are still missing due to not observing
either the year the mortgage was taken out or the region of residence.
35The function h is left generic to allow for interactions between our exogenous and endogenous variables
(in particular, age and the obligation ratio).
26δi and uit are, respectively, the individual speciﬁce ﬀect and the idionsyncratic error term
As pointed out in Blundell and Powell (2001), the control function approach uses
estimates of the reduced form error terms uit as "control variables" for the endogeneity of
the regressor yit in the original equation (11). Testing the signiﬁcance of these "control
variables" is therefore a test of endogeneity of the regressor yit.
The control function assumption is that
εit ⊥ yit|uit,δi,zit (14)
In order to integrate uit out, we therefore need to know the form of the distribution of
εit conditional on uit. If the joint distribution of εit and uit were normal, as in Smith
and Blundell (1986), one could write εit conditional on uit as linear: εit = u0
itγ + ηit.I n
our context, where estimation is performed by conditional logit, we cannot assume joint
normality of the two error terms and linearity of their conditional distribution. Instead,
we say that εit is some function of uit plus an error term (ηit), and we approximate this
with a second-order Taylor series expansion.
It follows that the conditional expectation of the binary variable Pit given the regressors
xit,t h eﬁxed eﬀect αi and the reduced form error terms uit, now takes the form
E(Pit|xit,α i,uit) ' Pr(xitβ0 + αi + γ1uit + γ2u2
it + ηit ≥ 0) (15)
= Λ(xitβ0 + αi + γ1uit + γ2u2
it)
and the test of endogeneity is a test of joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2.
(15) is estimated by a two-stage procedure that allows us to replace uit and u2
it with their
estimated counterparts ˆ uit and ˆ u2
it obtained from the ﬁrst stage estimation of (12).
In practice, the reduced form equation (12) is estimated by a within-groups regression
of the obligation ratio on the set of exogenous variables (log of other income, quadratic
in age, dummies for the youngest child aged 0-2 or 3-4, number of children) and the
"excluded instrument", i.e. the log of the current house prices at LAD level or the log
of the interaction between the average house price in the local region at the time the
mortgage was taken out and current mortgage interest rates. The results are reported
in the top panel of Table 7; column 1 and column 2 report, respectively, the outcomes
from using the two diﬀerent sets of instruments. The t-ratio for our instruments are,
respectively, 15.93 for the log of house price at LAD level and 16.17 for the log of the
interaction of house prices at regional level and mortgage interest rates. A quadratic form
of the estimated residuals from the ﬁrst stage estimation is included in the conditional
27logit regression as indicated in equation (15). A χ2(2) test of their joint signiﬁcance takes
the values of 1.6063 and 0.0084, respectively for the case where regional or LAD prices
are used. Since they do not appear to be signiﬁcant, we conclude that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity in our model.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
As mentioned in section 4.2, sensitivity analysis is performed with regard to the deﬁnition
of participation. Results are reported in table 8 and bring the same conclusions as the
deﬁnition of participation adopted for the main analysis.
Figures 1.c and 1.d also document the pattern of female labour market behaviour when
hours of work are used rather than participation. Although a declining pattern in hours
worked is observed in the age range 25-35 for both outright owners and owners with a
mortgage (or for owners with low mortgage and owners with high mortgage), it is still
true that a more pronunced dip is observed for the group of outright owners (alternatively,
for those with low mortgage).
Further sensitivity checks are performed by controlling for wealth. One concern regards
real assets, and in particular whether it is necessary to control for the value of the house
when analysing labour supply in relation to mortgages. In other words, we need to control
for the possibility that some households have experienced an increase in their house value
that has relaxed their liquidity constraint. Including a self-reported measure of the value
of the house (in logs), however, does not appear to change the results of our analysis.36
As reported in table 9, the conditional logit estimates are almost identical to those of the
basic model of table 5 (column 1) and the house value is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Another concern relates to ﬁnancial assets, in that it is necessary to rule out the
possibility that those who appear to be more subject to liquidity constraints (in the form
of a higher obligation ratio), do not hold ﬁnancial assets that could be used as collateral
instead of human capital. If that were the case, claiming that having a mortgage makes
the household work more, would not be correct as the liquidity constraint would not in
fact be binding.
The BHPS collects data on household ﬁnancial wealth every ﬁve years, namely in 1995
and 2000. Savings, investments and debt are reported separately by individuals, who
36The same conclusion applies when including the ratio between the value of the house and total
household income (excluding female’s labour income). Results are not reported for brevity.
28also report whether they hold their assets jointly with someone else, so that a measure
of net ﬁnancial wealth at the tax-unit level can be constructed. Missing information or
information for those who only provide bands for their assets are imputed according to
the age of the head of the beneﬁt unit, whether either of the adults in the beneﬁt unit have
completed any higher education and whether the head of the beneﬁt unit is self-employed.
The single components of net wealth are imputed separately.37
As pointed out in Banks, Smith and Wakeﬁeld (2002), wealth information across the
1995 and 2000 waves is not fully comparable, due to the diﬀerent deﬁnition of debt,
which in 1995 does not include student loans and overdrafts, whereas it does in 2000. We
then rely on the two single cross-sections of the data for our analysis. With only this
data at hand it is not possible to perform a conditional logit estimation of our model
with controls for wealth, which would allow comparability with the baseline model. We
therefore investigate the issue at a descriptive level. Table 10 reports the net ﬁnancial
wealth in 1995 and in 2000 for increasing levels of the obligation ratio within each chosen
age group. If increasing levels of the obligation ratio were to mean tighter liquidity
constraints, we would want those households with higher levels of obligation ratio to
hold lower net ﬁnancial wealth. This is in fact what generally emerges in table 10, being
violated only for the year 2000 for the top level of obligation ratio (note, however, that the
diﬀerence between the third and the fourth column is small and that standard deviations
are very large).
A ﬁnal sensitivity check is performed with respect to the timing of taking out the
mortgage. So far, all the observations of the selected sample have been used, regardless of
when the mortgage was taken out. The interaction term between the obligation ratio and
age of course allows for the mortgage-related constraint to vary over time. However, it is
being investigated whether the qualitative results hold for households that have taken out
a mortgage recently. In particular, also in relation to the use of house prices between 1995
and 2000 in order to test for endogeneity (see previous section), we perform our estimation
on the sub-sample that took out the mortgage between 1995 and 2000 and for whom the
house price is not missing, having a ﬁnal sample of 1318 observations. Conditional logit
estimation results are reported in table 11. Because of the small number of observations
where a change in outcome is observed, the sample used in the estimation is made of 192
observations, which justiﬁes obtaining very few signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The qualitative
37T h ew e a l t hd a t au s e di nt h i sp a p e rh a sb e e nd e r i v e da n di m p u t e db yB a n k s ,S m i t ha n dW a k e ﬁeld
(2002). For details, please refer to their paper.
29results, however, are unchanged and both the obligation ratio (for 25 year old) and the
interaction between the obligation ratio and having the youngest child between 0 and 2
remain signiﬁcant and stronger in magnitude. Consistently with the nature of the sub-
sample of those who have taken mortgages out recently, it would take longer to oﬀset the
positive eﬀect of mortgage on the participation of a female with no children (16 years)
relative to the baseline case (9 years).
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper contains an analysis of whether female labour supply is aﬀected by mortgage
commitments. It employs panel data techniques and uses the British Household Panel
Study (waves 3-10). The sample used includes any woman aged 25-45, in a couple, and
whose husband works full-time; it excludes self-employed individuals and renters. It is
found that mortgage commitments, as captured by the ratio between monthly mortgage
payment and household income excluding female’s earned income, have a positive eﬀect
on female participation. However, the negative eﬀect on female participation of having a
young child is very strong and the combined eﬀect of children and mortgage commitments
on participation can stay negative.
As opposed to previous studies that have used cross-sectional data, the key advantage
of the panel structure of this dataset is that it allows estimation of a static model that
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. This is done by means of conditional logit and
random eﬀects logit estimation. The conditional logit estimation method takes care of
the individual speciﬁc component of the error term by allowing it to be correlated in any
unspeciﬁed manner with the explanatory variables. Hence, preference towards work is
allowed to be correlated with mortgage decisions.
Endogeneity of the mortgage variable is a potential issue; it could emerge due, for
example, to correlation between mortgage decisions and transitory shocks or to reverse
causality (from participation to the mortgage). A test of endogeneity is performed in a
control function framework using house prices as control variables. We use, respectively,
contemporaneous house prices by house type at Local Authority District level, and the
interaction between house prices at regional level at the time the mortgage was taken out
and current mortgage interest rates. The null hypothesis of no endogeneity cannot be
rejected.
Sensitivity checks are performed with respect to real and to ﬁnancial assets. The value
of the house, when controlled for, does not appear to be signiﬁcant and does not change
30the results of the analysis. A ﬁrst look at ﬁnancial assets, which are measured in 1995
and in 2000, seems to rule out the possibility that many people with higher mortgage
commitments could hold ﬁnancial assets to use as collateral.
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33Appendix
Missing house prices at LAD level occur for the years 1993-1994 and mostly for Scottish
LADs in subsequent years. In particular, the distribution of missing house prices for the
years 1995-2000 is as follows:
Local Authority District # of observations in our sample
for LADs where house prices are missing
E Yorkshire; Holderness 3
Thamesdown 67





Annadale; Nithsdale; Stewarty; Wigtown 5
Dunfermline 6
Kirkcaldy; NE Fife 7
Aberdeen City 20
Banﬀ & Buchan; Moray 6
Gordon; Kincardine & Deeside 7
Bearsden ; Clydebank; Strathkelvin 63
Cumbernauld & Kilsyth; Monklands 11
Clydesdale; Cumnock Doon ; Kyle Carrick 31
Cunninghame 46
Eastwood; Kilmarnock & Loudon 19
Glasgow City 7
Renfrew 2
Angus; Perth & Kinross 18
Dundee City 43
34Table 1: Female participation by age and tenure
Table 1.a
age owners owners renters All
w/out mortgage w/mortgage
25-30 0.727 0.844 0.608 0.798
(0.451) (0.362) (0.489) (0.402)
44 1,677 398 2,119
30-35 0.411 0.801 0.637 0.765
(0.497) (0.399) (0.482) (0.424)
51 1,697 281 2,029
35-40 0.724 0.807 0.784 0.801
(0.450) (0.394) (0.412) (0.399)
87 1,454 158 1,699
40-45 0.784 0.848 0.787 0.838
(0.414) (0.359) (0.411) (0.369)
97 1,148 141 1,386





















Note: Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets),
and group size.
213 corresponds to the 33rd percentile of the mortgage repayment distributionTable 2: Female participation by age and level of obligation ratio
age or ≤ 0.104 0.104 <o r≤ 0.158 0.158 <o r≤ 0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.721 0.787 0.838 0.926
(0.450) (0.410) (0.368) (0.260)
222 390 520 589
30-35 0.658 0.769 0.832 0.865
(0.475) (0.422) (0.375) (0.342)
354 428 493 473
35-40 0.733 0.809 0.809 0.896
(0.443) (0.393) (0.393) (0.305)
487 404 341 309
40-45 0.820 0.825 0.829 0.953
(0.384) (0.381) (0.378) (0.212)
501 342 210 192
All 0.742 0.796 0.829 0.905
(0.437) (0.403) (0.377) (0.293)
1,564 1,564 1,564 1,563
Note: The obligation ratio is deﬁned as the ratio between monthly mortgage payment
and other family income (household income minus female’s earned income).
Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets),
and the group size.Table 3: Female participation by age, level of obligation ratio and age of the
youngest child
Youngest child 0-2
age or ≤ 0.104 0.104 <o r≤ 0.158 0.158 <o r≤ 0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.651 0.587 0.612 0.737
(0.481) (0.495) (0.489) (0.442)
63 92 121 114
30-35 0.381 0.660 0.692 0.667
(0.490) (0.476) (0.463) (0.474)
63 94 130 111
35-40 0.385 0.615 0.680 0.775
(0.493) (0.496) (0.471) (0.423)
39 26 50 40
40-45 0.571 0.750 0.571 1.000
(0.535) (0.463) (0.534) -
78 71
All 0.488 0.627 0.656 0.714
(0.501) (0.485) (0.476) (0.453)
172 220 308 266
Youngest child 3-4
age or ≤ 0.104 0.104 <o r≤ 0.158 0.158 <o r≤ 0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.513 0.688 0.696 0.886
(0.507) (0.467) (0.464) (0.321)
37 64 69 44
30-35 0.515 0.632 0.795 0.829
(0.504) (0.485) (0.406) (0.379)
66 87 88 76
35-40 0.489 0.717 0.729 0.860
(0.505) (0.455) (0.449) (0.351)
47 46 48 50
40-45 0.714 0.600 0.500 0.857
(0.488) (0.507) (0.527) (0.378)
71 5 1 07
All 0.515 0.665 0.735 0.853
(0.501) (0.473) (0.442) (0.355)
157 212 215 177
Note: Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets),
and group sizeTable 4: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation (N=6255)
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
female participation 0.818 0.386 0 1
other hh income 1996.309 1123.378 235.177 21483.810
log(other hh income) 7.494 0.438 5.460 9.975
age (rescaled by 25) 9.741 5.694 0 20
obligation ratio 0.168 0.096 0 1
youngest child 0-2 0.155 0.362 0 1
youngest child 3-4 0.122 0.327 0 1
no. of children 1.174 1.060 0 7
no education 0.119 0.324 0 1
education O level 0.453 0.498 0 1
education A level 0.203 0.402 0 1
higher degree 0.221 0.415 0 1Table 5: Conditional ML Logit, dep.var.=female participation
variable Conditional ML ML Random Eﬀects ML Pooled
log(other hh income) -1.547∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -1.237∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.205) (0.222) (0.084) (0.092)
age 0.333∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.072) (0.073) (0.032) (0.033)
age squared -0.007 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
obligation ratio 5.843∗∗ 8.023∗∗∗ 7.705∗∗∗ 6.856∗∗∗ 7.172∗∗∗
(2.505) (2.232) (2.358) (1.199) (1.237)
age*obligation ratio -0.679∗∗∗ -0.335∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.117 -0.130
(0.221) (0.176) (0.189) (0.093) (0.095)
youngest child 0-2 -1.525∗∗∗ -1.853∗∗∗ -2.011∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗ -0.905∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.344) (0.362) (0.192) (0.197)
youngest child 3-4 -1.437∗∗∗ -1.584∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ -0.885∗∗∗ -0.949∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.197) (0.193) (0.103) (0.105)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.802∗ -3.437∗∗ -3.387∗ -3.419∗∗∗ -2.996∗∗∗
(2.090) (1.758) (1.864) (1.050) (1.073)
no. of children -0.677∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.105) (0.112) (0.038) (0.039)
education O level 0.990∗∗∗ 0.224∗
(0.327) (0.117)
education A level 1.060∗∗∗ 0.232∗
(0.359) (0.134)
higher degree 1.817∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.139)
intercept 10.977∗∗ 11.408∗∗∗ 5.534∗∗ 3.638∗∗∗







No. of observations 1657 6255 6255 6255 6255
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% levelTable 6: Probit model, dep.var.=female participation
variable ML Random Eﬀects Chamberlain Random Eﬀects
log(other hh income) -0.531∗∗∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.121) (0.123)
age 0.123∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.043)
age squared -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
obligation ratio 4.083∗∗∗ 4.128∗∗∗ 2.488∗∗
(1.152) (1.170) (1.246)
age*obligation ratio -0.171∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.260∗∗
(0.093) (0.095) (0.102)
youngest child 0-2 -1.041∗∗∗ -1.116∗∗∗ -1.112∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.201) (0.196)
youngest child 3-4 -0.895∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗ -0.893∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.106)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -1.862∗ -1.985 -1.593
(0.982) (1.027) (1.012)
no. of children -0.568∗∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -0.506∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.062) (0.057)
education O level 0.536∗∗∗
(0.186)













σα 1.838 1.973 1.854
(0.082) (0.129) (0.094)
No. of observations 6255 6255 6255
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level
-Table 7: Conditional ML Logit, dep.var.=female participation - Endogeneity:
control function technique
First stage: Within-groups regression
control variable 1 control variable 2




age squared -0.0002∗∗∗ -2.06e-04∗∗∗
(4.50e-05) (6.13e-05)
youngest child 0-2 0.0042 0.0049
(0.0029) (0.0038)








No. of observations 5775 4125
Second stage: test of residuals
1st-step est. residuals 7.511 0.660
(6.821) (8.816)
(1st-step est. residuals)2 -18.784 -1.954
(26.301) (40.140)
χ2(2) 1.6063 0.0084
No. of observations 1524 867
Note1:
Control variable 1: log(REG house prices at t=mortgage taken out*current interest rates)
Control variable 2: log(LAD house prices, 1995-2000) (original panel: 1993-2000)
Note2:
Bootstrapped St. Err. (2nd stage) in parentheses (500 bootstrap samples of size n)
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% levelTable 8: Conditional ML Logit, Sensitivity analysis: alternative deﬁnitions of
dep.var.=female participation
variable Def. 1 Def. 2
(#weeks worked)>0 employment status: in empl.




age squared -0.006 -0.006∗
(0.005) (0.004)
obligation ratio 5.888∗∗ 5.561∗∗∗
(3.036) (2.091)
age*obligation ratio -0.611∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.188)
youngest child 0-2 -1.344∗∗∗ -1.756∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.339)
youngest child 3-4 -1.871∗∗∗ -1.112∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.198)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.630 -3.013∗
(2.528) (1.627)
no. of children -1.044∗∗∗ -0.505∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.154)
No. of observations 1388 2237
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% levelTable 9: Conditional ML Logit, dep.var.=female participation - Sensitivity
analysis : house value
variable












youngest child 0-2 -1.520∗∗∗
(0.413)
youngest child 3-4 -1.442∗∗∗
(0.226)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.879∗
(2.091)
no. of children -0.662∗∗∗
(0.174)
No. of observations 1657
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% levelTable 10: Net ﬁnancial wealth by age and level of obligation ratio
Year 1995
age or ≤ 0.104 0.104 <o r≤ 0.158 0.158 <o r≤ 0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 18,840 4,635 1,452 2,563
(37,890) (11,695) (9,208) (10,148)
31 49 76 77
30-35 20,445 14,564 5,234 3,852
(50,673) (47,771) (17,205) (13,653)
47 48 54 54
35-40 16,999 11,381 13,797 8,224
(33,245) (30,278) (32,122) (17,226)
56 49 36 38
40-45 33,543 11,993 10,156 9,991
(151,211) (25,522) (30,770) (44,620)
46 46 26 21
All 22,444 10,602 6,009 4,883
(83,860) (31,519) (21,228) (19,238)
180 192 192 190
Year 2000
age or ≤ 0.104 0.104 <o r≤ 0.158 0.158 <o r≤ 0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 13,563 1,520 1,376 2,285
(34,591) (13,808) (12,719) (12,836)
27 39 58 80
30-35 18,346 9,895 5,226 7,360
(35,157) (24,040) (21,800) (43,853)
31 53 66 68
35-40 9,721 11,900 8,886 9,464
(18,909) (50,624) (59,756) (36,987)
61 52 48 48
40-45 24,346 18,181 2,976 10,169
(60,353) (30,431) (15,543) (35,010)
68 46 34 31
All 17,024 10,731 4,623 6,400
(42,815) (33,778) (32,573) (32,941)
187 190 190 227
Note: Net ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as (savings+investments-debt)
and does not include housing.
Savings, investments and wealth have been imputed separately when missing
    Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets),
   and group sizeTable 11: Conditional ML Logit, dep.var.=female participation - Sensitivity
analysis: restricted sample - hh that took out mortgage 1995-2000
variable










youngest child 0-2 0.734
(1.418)
youngest child 3-4 -0.574
(0.658)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -10.363∗
(6.274)
no. of children -1.143
(0.848)
No. of observations 192
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
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control: youngest child 0-2
age at date of interview
 low obligation ratio  high obligation ratio































control: youngest child 3-4
age at date of interview
 low obligation ratio  high obligation ratio
25 30 35 40 45
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